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In this paper, I argue that citizens have an entitlement to sanction representatives, but representatives
have tools to anticipate this sanction and reconstruct their views in order to anticipate the views of
the people they are supposed to represent. I also argue that represented and representatives have an enti-
tlement to sanction democratic representative institutions and practices, but, unless citizens across the
spectrum of all representative relationships agree onmany fronts, sanctions are likely to violate the demo-
cratic requirement that all subjected to a collective decision should not be mere objects of coercion.
Introduction
There is a widespread belief that strengthening representative institutions may cure the
deficit of democratic institutions and practices. Instruments of direct democracy, such as refer-
enda and public consultations, are increasingly popular around the world, and experiments
with a deliberative intent have been mushrooming in a number of different cities, districts,
and states. However, within the framework of representation theory, scholars have paid
little attention to the justificatory component of these reforms and to the (more or less) demo-
cratic character of the process that, from a certain democratic representative institution, brings
about a new (more or less) democratic representative institution. This paper contributes to
these discussions by addressing the two issues in continuity with one another.
Does democratic representation incorporate an entitlement to change democratic
representative institutions and practices? Yes, it does. So, I argue that in representative democ-
racies, an entitlement to sanction representatives and an entitlement to sanction representa-
tive democratic institutions and practices are normative premises for assessing, controlling,
and changing democratic representative institutions. But this is just a part of the story. As I
shall demonstrate in this paper, it is very difficult to change democratic representative insti-
tutions and practices through systems of actions that, over time, are fully coherent with the
democratic character of democratic representative institutions. This is not great news. After
all, changing fundamental rules often requires super-majorities because of reasonable dis-
agreement. Here, I argue that, given the many simultaneous objects of disagreements that
the decision of innovating democratic representative institutions entails, and accepted the
democratic principle that members of the demos are not merely objects of coercion, a
trade-off between truly democratic ambitions and reforms that are achieved through partially
democratic processes is indeed the best we can realistically hope for.
Therefore, the paper unfolds as follows. In the following section, I shall offer a minimal
definition of democratic representation. From this definition, in the second section, I shall
argue that democratic representation justifies incremental reforms and drastic changes in
democratic representative institutions. The third section of the paper examines the democratic
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character of democratic innovation in the context of democratic representative institutions. In
the last two sections, then, I shall explain why it is so difficult to pass from a democratic repre-
sentative institution to another through processes that are fully democratic.
Democratic Representation
This paper is about democratic representation (Plotke 1997: 31; see also Disch [2011];
Dovi [2002]; Manin [1997]; Mansbridge [1999, 2003]; Urbinati [2006]; Urbinati and Warren
[2008]; Castiglione and Warren [2013]) in plural societies, not representation in general
(Rehfeld 2006, 2018). If we think most contemporary normative and empirical disputes
about representation occur within a more or less explicit democratic framework, this declara-
tion of intents may seem redundant, if not problematic. Some readers would collapse the
meaning of the two terms into one concept: representation, they would say, is always demo-
cratic. I think this is a fuzzy reading that is short on analytical accuracy. It makes it difficult to
recognise and evaluate the democratic (and the nondemocratic) character of democratic (and
nondemocratic) representation. By taking representation in general and democratic represen-
tation as one and the same thing, we may lack the required conceptual precision to justify the
reasons why we believe representation in institutions such as Chinese local congresses is not
democratic representation but still a kind of political representation that deserves attention (e.
g., Manion 2015). In this section, I shall provide a definition of democratic representation that is
deliberately minimal and descriptive. It shall be sufficiently abstract to be compatible with the
different ways other scholars conceptualise representation in a democratic sense.
The scholarly literature argues that democratic representation is a process (e.g., Disch
2011: 108–9; Pitkin 1967: 218; Plotke 1997: 32; Young 2000: 132). This process may entail a dia-
logic phase in which citizens clarify their preferences (Plotke 1997: 32) or interests (Young 2000:
132; see also Squire [2008]: 190). Notably, this process is not static: ‘representing’ is an activity
that unravels diachronically (e.g., Mansbridge 2003: 518; Rehfeld 2011: 633) through presenta-
tions and re-presentations, creations and re-creations of claims, and, perhaps, collective iden-
tities. Certainly, it entails a phase through which a certain being comes to be a ‘democratic
representative’ (e.g., Rehfeld 2006; Saward 2010). On this view, different systematic series of
actions (including voting, but also deliberation, lottery, or other generally accepted procedures
[e.g., Manin 1997; Syntomer 2010]) add the temporary ontological attribute of being a member
of the demos that all other members of the demos (including other members with the same
ontological status [Rehfeld 2006]) could recognise as a democratic representative. In this way,
the process constitutes a distinctive relational typology: a political relationship between two
poles, the represented (Y) and the representative (X), in the activity of democratic decision-
making. So this process brings about a kind of political relation between a certain X and a
certain Y. In the different forms of representation as social and political facts, democratic repre-
sentatives may be formal political actors, such as presidents, senators, or other elected officials.
But they may also be informal political actors, such as lobbyists or leaders of civil-society organ-
isations, international nongovernmental organisations, or social movements (Montanaro
2012). The represented may be living and nonliving human beings.
I have said that, generally speaking, both X and Y are members of the demos. Qua
members of the demos, they enter into a special relation with one another because a systema-
tic series of actions constitutes them as a representative and as a represented for a certain
period of time. The representative X might be in relation with several other members of the
demos. Meanwhile, Y might enter into a special relation with different representatives at the
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same time. In principle, this process adds a layer of mediation (X) between the government
and Y (Rehfeld 2009: 214–16). However, this layer of mediation is contingent on Y’s autonomy
as a moral being who has reasons to choose X. Y can have many different reasons, but this does
not challenge the presupposition that, within the interpersonal relationship between a rep-
resented and a representative, the location of authority remains in Y as an autonomous
being who has to be the author of his or her own laws and can change his or her mind
(e.g., Manin 1997; Mansbridge 2009).
The relationship between X and Y may be understood as unidirectional (from X to Y) or
as bidirectional (from X to Y and from Y to X). For instance, the traditional model of democratic
representation is unidirectional. Hannah Pitkin captures this when she writes that in demo-
cratic representation, the ‘representative must be responsive to [the represented] rather
than the other way around’ (1967: 40). Lisa Disch argues that representation is dynamic and
interactive: ‘Representatives’, she writes, ‘look backward to preferences that have been
expressed, and orient themselves forward in a speculative mode toward what their constitu-
ency might want or be included to want at the next election’ (Disch 2011: 100; see also Urbinati
[2000]).
Moreover, the relation between X and Y has two components: a causal component and a
modal component. The causal component explains why a certain process has brought a
specific X to represent Y. The modal component expresses a continuous indicator that helps
to evaluate the relation between X and Y, given the specific causal component that links repre-
sentatives and represented. For instance, Eline Severs says that ‘responsiveness’ is a systemic
indicator of the quality of representation (2010). Lisa Disch submits ‘reflexivity’ as the norma-
tive standard for evaluating political representation (2011). When the continuous indicator
approximates its minimum value, the process may produce a new causal component that
makes the same X or another X a representative of Y.
When we speak of democratic representation, it is plausible to say that the process and
the relationship between X and Y are ascribable to a system of institutions and practices in
which generic norms of democracy are realised. Typically, democratic theory holds (at least)
that the democratic module requires political arrangements to instantiate the principle that
all affected by collective decisions should have an opportunity to influence the outcome (Urbi-
nati and Warren 2008). Let me unpack the meaning of this module. First, most democratic the-
orists presuppose that each democratic regime (national or international) has a demos (e.g.,
Christiano 2008; Habermas 1996; Näsström 2007). Second, they assume democracies are
regimes in which the many rule. Third, they tell us how to identify these many: they are all
those affected by a collective decision. Often, as Sofia Näsström (2011) has argued convin-
cingly, this way of reasoning collapses two principles (the all-affected principle and the all-
subjected principle) into one.
The all-subjected principle assumes a certain political unit (national or international) and
focuses on individuals. From this, it takes existing boundaries as thresholds for inclusion and
exclusion (Benhabib 2004: 215; Gould 2006: 49; Näsström 2011: 116–20). The all-affected prin-
ciple challenges the idea of pre-existing borders, and it focuses on the interests people have or
may have. On this view, the scope of democratic decisions draws the boundaries of a demo-
cratic constituency. Some decisions may touch the interests of people living within a state’s
borders; other democratic decisions, such as border regulation or climate-change policies,
may touch the interests of individuals beyond the state (Näsström 2011: 126). Seen in this
way, the scope of the demos may expand outside the borders of a state (Pensky 2007), inter-
generationally (Skirbekk 1997), and even to animals and plants.
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Most democratic theorists (e.g., Urbinati and Warren 2008; Young 2000) acknowledge
the complexity of democratic decision-making in an increasingly interconnected world and
the urgency of including extraterritorial and nonterritorial actors. Nevertheless, in existing
representative democracies, residency (if not citizenship) remains the most obvious
channel to democratic participation. In modern constitutional democracy, individuals can
claim participation qua residents (or citizens). In international or supranational institutions,
individuals can participate qua residents of member states. It seems, therefore, plausible to
think that what Urbinati and Warren call the all-affected principle is, in fact, the all-subjected
principle.1
In the context of representation theory, the democratic module specifies what X and Y
can do. Representation is democratic when it is at least coherent with the all-subjected prin-
ciple. There is no single procedure to realise this principle, but each process should be trans-
formative so that some members of the demos become members of the demos who are
recognised as democratic representatives. In its minimal form, such as the ‘one person, one
vote’ formula, this principle entails both choosing the best representative and a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote within the predetermined boundaries of the relevant political
community. Otherwise, it may denote a political and deliberative involvement in the demo-
cratic process of decision-making, as well as a multiplication of the sites of debates (Näsström
2015: 10; Urbinati 2006: 196).
From this, it follows that the relation between X and Y is democratic even if X and Y do
not foster the norms and values distinctive of democracy. Not all representatives do in fact
engage in advocacy of democratic values, despite moving with a system of institutions and
practices through which generic norms of democracy are realised (Dovi 2007: 15–18). Similarly,
the relation between X and Y is democratic even if X and Y do not respect democratic norms.
For instance, when a representative X refuses to deliberate with other citizens on the grounds
that he is obeying God’s direct command to him, it seems odd to think that the relation
between Y and X is not democratic (Dovi 2007: 15–18). It also seems odd to think the demo-
cratic character of an interpersonal relationship of representation between X and Y can be
judged according to the effects of what X does as a participant in the democratic system
(Kuyper 2016). I hold that an interpersonal relationship between X and Y is democratic in a
more fundamental way. It embodies the principle that in democracy, the many rule and, there-
fore, individuals are not merely objects of legislation. Directly or through their representatives,
autonomous agents take part in the formation of coercive rules (Gutmann and Thompson
2004). History has been telling us that interpersonal relationships that are democratic in char-
acter may bring about antidemocratic outcomes. However undesirable as they might be, these
outcomes do not make the interpersonal relationship of representation antidemocratic. Anti-
democratic outputs may make the whole system less democratic, but this seems to be another
kind of question.
In this section, I have gestured towards a minimal and descriptive definition of demo-
cratic representation. Specifically, I have held that democratic representation expresses a
process ascribable to a system of institutions and practices in which the all-subjected principle
is realised. This process brings about a temporary and political relation between a certain X (the
representative) and a certain Y (the represented) that is contingent on a causal and a modal
component. In the next sections, I shall focus on representative relationships when rep-
resented citizens feel they are misrepresented and when both representatives and citizens
feel they are misrepresented.
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Representative Relationships and Three Entitlements
I have argued that all democratic representative relationships are distinctive relational
typologies that, in the political sphere, arise from a process that brings together X and Y. So
democratic representation constitutes two kinds of political person: the representative and
the represented. X and Y remain two distinct poles. In this way, the represented can judge
and control those who represent them, with two provisos. First, representatives should act
on behalf of the causal component that informs the representative relationship (Hamilton
2014: 113–14; Plotke 1997: 30–31). Second, such a component may change in the future if rep-
resented citizens feel they are somehow misrepresented. So the process of democratic rep-
resentation brings about a relationship between X and Y where both X and Y are active.
And representative relationships are venues of participation and direct influence as well as
the sites of political struggles (Disch 2011; Hamilton 2014; Näsström 2015; Plotke 1997; Urbinati
2000, 2006; Young 2000). Representatives have a significant degree of autonomy, but the rep-
resented can inform and control what they do. To put the same idea in other terms, represen-
tative relationships combine ‘an entitlement to represent something/someone’ and ‘an
entitlement to sanction representatives’. By ‘sanction’, I mean a mechanism of control for
enforcing a represented citizen’s standards in the representative relationship.
By being recognised as ‘a representative’ within the perimeter of a democratic political
sphere, it is permissible for a citizen to do certain things, bear the resulting burdens, and enjoy
the resulting benefits. Simultaneously, by being recognised as ‘represented’ within the per-
imeter of a democratic political sphere, citizens can assess and control their representatives
(Castiglione and Warren 2013: 155: Runciman 2007: 97). Taking these points together,
through the process of democratic representation, representatives acquire a distinctive
capacity to represent the represented, provided the represented are convinced by the repre-
sentatives’ answer to the causal component. At the same time, through the process of demo-
cratic representation, the represented acquire a distinctive political capacity to sanction other
citizens—their representatives—because of their feelings concerning the modal component.
Representatives whose actions provoke explicit objections by those they claim to rep-
resent, even if they believe they are acting in agreement with the causal component both
parties agree with, are objects of the judgment of the represented, whose evaluative criteria
they cannot entirely predict. Lawrence Hamilton submits that representation should be consti-
tuted so that citizens have real control over representatives, in the sense of having the insti-
tutional means to remove them from office if their judgments are deemed poor in a
number of ways (2014, 2017). In the same vein, Suzanne Dovi says that ‘opportunities for citi-
zens to evaluate and sanction their representatives lie at the heart of the practices of represen-
tative democracies’ (2007: 96).
Here, two remarks are in order. The mere observation that democratic representation
includes the normative justification of two sanctions does not make the represented well
equipped to unveil all kinds of misrepresentation. In some cases, representatives are misrepre-
senting the interests of the represented but the represented are not capable of acknowledging
this. Here the represented are not actually using their sanctions, but sanctions are indirectly
informing what the representatives are doing (e.g., Manin 1997). Moreover, the interpersonal
relationship of democratic representation associates X and Y in a distinctive manner. And this
link includes the entitlement to sanction (among other things). For this reason, despite the
emphasis on sanctions, I think the present account is also consistent with the selection
model (Mansbridge 2009). The selection model focuses mostly on what occurs ex ante, such
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION AND DEMOCRATIC SANCTIONS 5
as putting the appropriate representative in office according to policy congruence or align-
ment of objectives (Giger and Lefkofridi 2016; Lefevere et al. 2017), rather than what occurs
during the principal–agent relationship. My account is descriptive, and it says that in demo-
cratic representation, there are two kinds of sanction. I am not saying they are more relevant
than congruence and alignment. Actually, Mansbridge also accepts that the represented retain
the capacity to replace selected representatives (2009).
Moreover, even if the actual opportunity and capacity to hold elected officials to account
for their actions and policies is limited, electoral mechanisms are frequently seen as effective
means for rejecting past representatives at the ballots (Mansbridge 2003: 516, 2011: 624).
Therefore, citizens may issue binding instructions to the representatives, or they may
change the procedures by which representatives are appointed (Runciman 2007: 97). In the
case of non-elective representatives, varied forms of control, such as governance networks
and deliberative devices, and identification in terms of nonparty identities may ensure
better control of representatives (Saward 2009: 8). Meanwhile, representatives are aware of
the entitlement to sanction. Representatives may use their political power deceptively and
against the political will of the represented: rhetorical arguments, symbolic rewards to buy
off citizens who had been making more substantial demands, propaganda, the appeal to
common sense, usage of terms out of context, withholding relevant data and information,
and overloading citizens with too much information are all instances of manipulatory politics
that may inhibit the exercise of the entitlement to sanction (Goodin 1980). Further, represen-
tatives may bolster their position by constructing favourable representations of themselves
(Saward 2009: 7).2
Misrepresentation also may be the result of distortions that lie beyond the representa-
tive relationships. Certainly, it may result from the failures of representatives, but it may also
result from the architecture of some representative democratic institutional arrangements
(Dovi 2007: 49).3 For example, the congressional practice of declaring bills ‘emergencies’
does not allow for representatives to have time to read and consult their constituents about
how legislation would adversely affect them (Dovi 2007: 49). In the EU, decision-making pro-
cedures at the supranational level have been blamed for concentrating much of the decision-
making power in the executive. In the same vein, transformation in the shape of the political
party may alter the representative relationship so that it goes beyond the interpersonal
relationship between X and Y.
However, at the heart of democratic representation, there is also an entitlement to assess
and control a system of institutions and practices in which generic norms of democracy are not
realised. In principle, both representatives and represented have this entitlement to resist as a
form of voice to be exercised under extreme circumstances, cases where the law systematically
differs from the will of the community at large (Gargarella 2003). In these cases, representative
democratic institutions may produce outcomes that are somehow consistent with fundamen-
tal democratic values, such as freedom and equality. Nevertheless, these outcomes are proble-
matic as they violate the principle that, directly or through representatives, autonomous
agents take part in the formation of coercive rules. In this situation, qua autonomous
members of the demos who have the right to take part in the formation of collectively
binding decisions, both represented and representatives have the right to sanction represen-
tative institutions and practices. This entitlement is even prior to the entitlement to sanction
representatives. It concerns the relationship between autonomous individuals and potentially
coercive political institutions, democratic and nondemocratic.
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However, it does not excuse every behaviour. Being grounded in the right to resist, the
entitlement to sanction representative institutions requires a degree of proportionality (Kauf-
mann 1985–86). Otherwise, the right is not merely that of resistance but of revolution. In par-
ticular, the right to resist, as opposed to a right of revolution (Wolin 1982), has as its goal a
return to the original condition—the ideal without distortions—or to improve the original con-
dition in line with its own grounding principles (Ginsburg et al. 2013; Kaufman 1985–86).
This opens the discourse on proportionality and resistance when members of the demos
have a sufficient justification to sanction representative institutions. As Archon Fung has
already argued, the response to this question implies a complex internal calculus (2005). It
weighs the ethical costs of taking action that violates norms against uncertain gains for
justice and democracy (2005: 402). When existing practices and institutions are ‘flawed but
improvable’ (Fung 2005: 403), the ethical costs of taking action have to be as low as possible,
and the democratic gains have to be transparent. When existing practices and institutions fail
to respect the all-subjected principle, democratic gains have to be transparent, but, in this case,
the ethical costs of taking action can be higher. Still, the choices of means should be scaled
against two things, the rejection of the all-subjected principle and the idea that individuals
are not merely objects of coercion.
These ideas are not new. In the literature on democratic representation, it is often
assumed. For instance, Dovi writes that representative relationships work on the assumption
that representative democracies need to provide fair procedures for giving voice to concerns
of citizens and for authorising binding decisions (Dovi 2007: 14). Actually, the question of legit-
imate popular uprisings has plagued political theories for a very long time. For the American
founders, this question was of such deep importance that it stands at the very basis of modern
constitutionalism as we know it. ‘Whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends’, the American founders wrote,
it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. (Declaration of Independence, para. 2)
In the context of democratic representation, the entitlement to sanction representative demo-
cratic institutions and practices may lead to justifying the demand for incremental reforms
when other remedies to ensure representation fails. For instance, we can think of a parliamen-
tary reform, new party lists, the composition of new constituencies, the construction of
schemes for proportional representation, caucuses, district assemblies, mini-publics, citizen
panels, participatory budgeting, updated tribunals of the plebs, constitutional revisions, and
institutional means that increase government’s attentiveness towards the electorate and the
representatives. Moreover, the entitlement to sanction representative democratic institutions
and practices may lead to justifying the demand for drastic changes when incremental reforms
fail. These actions are intended to remind governments that citizens are the ultimate source of
legitimate rule. For this reason, a provision is inherent in the entitlement to sanction the system
of institutions through which democratic values are realised: change has to occur in a demo-
cratic way, and it has to lead to democratic institutional forms. In other words, the entitlement
to sanction the system of democratic institutions is solely about the opportunity to create more
democratic representative institutions.
So representative relationships comprise three entitlements: X’s entitlement to represent
Y, Y’s entitlement to sanction X, and X and Y’s entitlement to sanction a system of institutions
and practices in which generic norms of democracy are realised. The last entitlement originates
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in a general entitlement to resist both democratic and undemocratic institutions and practices,
under special circumstances.
Yet it is not necessarily true that, in the present of democratic representative institutions,
the instruments and mechanisms of democratic sanctioning will make institutions more
responsive.4 Among other things, the responsiveness of democratic representative institutions
is contingent on the competence of the represented people and on the competence of the
demos as a whole in a context in which the represented can be manipulated but also the repre-
sentatives are vulnerable to implicit bias and exogenous control.5 However, as I shall argue in
the following, it is true that, in order to count as democratic innovations, incremental reforms
and drastic changes have to improve at least one of the possible democratic axes. When exist-
ing democratic representative institutions do not respect fully the all-subjected principle, incre-
mental reforms and drastic changes may reconstitute the demos, but this is not necessarily the
case. It may also happen that, from the normative standpoint of the all-subjected principle,
there is no significant improvement. Yet, there are gains in other relevant normative areas,
such as, among many others, accountability, trust and transparency. It is evident that these
hard balances would require a longer discussion. In this paper, given the focus on the justifi-
catory component of reforms and on the process leading to the implementation of democratic
change, I shall maintain that incremental changes and drastic reforms aim to respect fully the
all-subjected principle. For this reason, in the next section, I shall explain the link between
democratic innovation and the all-subjected principle. In this way, I shall be able to identify
a starting point (that of existing democratic representative institutions), an endpoint (that of
new democratic representative institutions) and a transition between these two points. Such
a transition will be the object of the last sections of the paper.
The Democratic Character of Incremental Reforms and Drastic Changes
I have said that the democratic module of democratic representation requires demo-
cratic representative institutions to instantiate the principle that, thanks to the work of their
representatives, all members of the demos who are subject to a collective decision should
have an opportunity to influence the outcome. I have also argued that, even within the frame-
work of a theory of democratic representation, when existing practices and institutions do not
fully respect the all-subjected principle, sanctions to democratic representative institutions,
such as incremental reforms and drastic changes, are justified.
If we think that incremental changes and drastic reforms aim to improve the democratic
status quo of otherwise stable democratic representative institutions, the question of who
have the right to participate in the decisions of a reformed democratic representative insti-
tutions is not trivial. At a minimum, it helps to compare present and future states of affairs.
Nevertheless, in the literature on democratic innovations, references to the all-subjected prin-
ciple are not intelligible. In this section, I shall say that the all-subjected principle remains the
most plausible normative criterion to assess reforms and drastic changes to democratic repre-
sentative institutions.
Over the years, political philosophers have constituted the demos in many ways. One
may link membership in the demos making the laws with the legal or moral obligation to
obey such laws. One may argue that the demos is a set of mutually recognised members
(Nozick 1974: chap. 10). One, following democratic theorists such as Goodin (2007) and
Fung (2013), may defend the principle of affected interests. The first two alternatives seem
too exclusionary. When we link membership with the moral or legal obligation to obey
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laws, we fail to notice those people who are obliged to obey our laws but who are not entitled
to membership in the demos (Goodin 2007: 42). When we adopt the Nozickean perspective,
we exclude many individuals who are otherwise included in the demos of contemporary
liberal democratic regimes.
The principle of affected interests seems a much more promising alternative. On this
view, individuals should exercise influence over those decisions that affect one’s important
interest (Fung 2013; Goodin 2007). In a world where democratic institutions make decisions
affecting the interests of individuals who live in other countries and who have little (if any)
influence on such institutions, the principle of affected interests, as Fung writes, demands
‘institutional reform efforts that alter the boundaries… to include who are affected but
lack influence’ (2013: 254). And so, this principle ‘would mean giving virtually everyone
everywhere a vote on virtually everything decided anywhere’ (Goodin 2007: 68). Neverthe-
less, when we use the principle of affected interests as a normative criterion to assess demo-
cratic innovations in the field of democratic representative institutions, it seems over-
inclusive. The principle of affected interests would ground the evaluation of democratic
innovations (both incremental reforms and drastic changes) on terms that clash with the
ways trough which representative relationships are constituted and negotiated in contem-
porary representative democracies. At both the local and national level, residency is the
most obvious channel to democratic participation in existing representative democracies.
Moreover, unlike the principle of affected interests, the demos of democratic representative
institutions is not organised around a problem-based approach. It is true that certain issues
may affect different individuals in different places of the world, but, from this observation, it
does not follow that all individuals (residents and non-residents) have the same claim to
reform democratic representative institutions and the general institutional context where
such issues arise. For this reason, it is plausible to adopt the all-subjected principle as a nor-
mative criterion for innovating democratic representative institutions. In this way, all individ-
uals (and only those individuals) living under the authority of a democratic representative
institutions should have the right to influence decisions that affect them. From the all-sub-
jected principle, a legitimate democratic innovation of representative institutions is a
complex mix of rules and practices that improve the prior application of the normative
requirement that all and only those who are under the authority of a democratic represen-
tative institution are both authors and subjects of the laws.
On these grounds, in the next sections, I shall argue that, despite the entitlement to sanc-
tion democratic representative institutions and the possible democratic gains granted by
certain forms of democratic innovation, it is very difficult to sanction representative democratic
institutions through a process that is fully democratic. In a democratic context, sanctioning
democratic representative institutions in a democratic way implies that the burdens of
change should be somehow evenly distributed across all those subjected to it. But citizens
may be in disagreement on many issues that correlate with the attempt of reforming existing
democratic representative institutions. If disagreement is so pervasive, operating at the same
time and multi-level, and change must occur in agreement with the all-subjected principle, the
fully democratic exercise of one’s entitlement to sanction the system of institutions and prac-
tices in which generic norms of democracy are realised is very difficult. More often than not,
since all members are entitled to influence the solution of all relevant disagreements, and
since it is very difficult to grant this entitlement in all the relevant disagreements at the
same time, the process leading to a future democratic gain may be only partially democratic.
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Representative Democracy and Disagreements
It is common to think that democratic representation occurs in a context of disagree-
ment among parties with different worldviews and moral commitments. Hamilton assumes
that ‘politics is judgment about which benefits ought to accrue to whom under conditions
of conflicting norms, needs, interests, or at the very least a condition of constant moral dis-
agreement’ (2017: 6). Nadia Urbinati writes that ‘proportional representation also recognizes
pluralism in the first instance, whereas majoritarianism first recognizes the majority and
then tries to deal with the reality of pluralism’ (2000: 771). And Dovi argues that ‘it should
now be evident that any adequate ethics of democratic representation must address the
ways in which representatives should advance public policies under conditions of pluralism’
(2007: 9). These views take disagreement as a singular. Rather than conceptualising democratic
representation vis-à-vis one all-encompassing moral disagreement, I believe it would be useful
to identify different disagreements, which I shall call D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7, D8, and D9.6 In
this way, we can study how disagreements shape the relationships between the represented
and their representatives, the relationships among the represented, and the relationships
among representatives, the represented, and the institutions and practices in which generic
norms of democracy are realised.
Citizens of modern democracies may have different goals. In John Rawls’s words, ‘The
political culture of a democratic society is always marked by a diversity of opposing and irre-
concilable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines’ (Rawls 2005: 64). This kind of disagree-
ment (D1) may occur across representative-represented relations or within the same
representative-represented relation (D2). Here the line between D1 and D2 may be blurry.
D1 identifies disagreements among groups of people with different religious, philosophical,
and moral doctrines. Seen from the outside, people in the group are taken to have the
same religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. D2 identifies disagreements internal to
those groups, which, seen from the outside, seem homogeneous. Then citizens may subject
representatives to multiple and conflicting standards of evaluation—and this disagreement
(D3) is itself to be understood as a characteristic of democratic institutions and practices (Mans-
bridge 2003). Those who equate a commitment to democracy with a commitment to pluralism
tend to hold that all criteria for identifying good representatives are contingent, varying with
the particular opinions, interests, and perspectives of different citizens. D3 and D2 might look
like one and the same thing. However, D2 expresses the application of moral criteria in a way
that exceeds what the representative actually is doing. Someone could say it describes dis-
agreements about congruence and alignment. D3 identifies disagreements on how to evaluate
what the representative is doing.
Increasing attention has been paid to the observation that between represented and
representative there might be disagreement (D4), and this creates, as Plotke puts it, ‘a perma-
nent need for representatives and those who are representing themselves to negotiate their
relationship’ (1997: 31; see also Mansbridge [2003, 2011]; Urbinati [2006]). Here the rep-
resented and the representatives might agree at the D1 and at the D2 level, but, on specific
issues, the representative may think it is better to do A while the represented thinks it is
better to do B. Representatives, then, will almost inevitably advance public policies that
some citizens will endorse and others condemn (D5). In this case, disagreement is about the
priority of a certain end over another. At the same time, representatives may disagree with
one another on what public policies will contribute to the public good. In this case, in a
context in which representatives and represented agree on a certain end, representatives
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disagree on the best means to achieve the end (D6). Then, citizens may favour different con-
ceptions of democratic norms and values. And some democratic citizens can hold some other
values to be more important than democratic values (D7). At the same time, democratic citi-
zens will disagree not just about public policies and the standards to evaluate their represen-
tatives. Democratic citizens may also possess opposing standards to evaluate democratic
representative institutions (D8). For instance, someone can favour democratic representative
institutions because such institutions allow one group of citizens to dominate another
group. Others may favour democratic representative institutions because they ensure stability
and good governance. Others may favour democratic institutions because they mirror the
moral diversity of modern democracies.
In representative democracy, citizens may envision better-than-existing democratic
representative institutions in different ways (D9). Typically, someone may argue that a circle
of experts may represent the interests of all citizens better-than-existing democratic represen-
tative institutions. Someone else may favour mini-publics or citizen panels. Elites may be for
parliamentary reforms. And disadvantaged groups may envision deliberative democratic insti-
tutions and practices that, in their own architecture, consider the frequent experience of
marginalisation.
Therefore, as Table 1 shows, what we tend to consider as the disagreement comprises (at
least) nine kinds of disagreement that inform the process of democratic representation and the
resulting relationships between representatives and the citizens they claim to represent. In this
context, if the degree to which democratic representation is democratic depends upon the
degree to which it realises the all-subjected principle, the different disagreements that charac-
terise representative democracies may function as firewalls during the process of sanctioning
democratic representative institutions. Like firewalls, many simultaneous fronts of disagree-
ment may inhibit change by recalling that, for each area of disagreement, each member of
the demos ought to be both author and subject of the relevant solution. With these words,
I am not saying disagreements are bad for democratic representation. Specifically, each dis-
agreement is an alert calling for all subjected by a collectively binding decision, such as one
changing the system of institutions and practices (or a part of it), to monitor and control
and have a say. Then, as table 1 shows, some of these disagreements, such as D1 and D7,
TABLE 1.
Disagreements in representative democracies
Who Object Character
D1 Groups Conception of the good Polarising
D2 Members of the group Varieties of the same conception of
the good
Deliberative





D5 Representatives Ends Deliberative
D6 Representatives Means Deliberative
D7 Members of the demos Conceptions of democracy Polarising
D8 Members of the demos Standards Polarising and
Deliberative
D9 Members of the demos Better-than-existing representative
institutions
Deliberative
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might be deeper and polarising. But many other disagreements, such as D2, D4, D5, D6, and
D9, are opportunities for deliberation between representatives, between represented and
representatives, or among members of the demos as a whole. D3 and D8 may be either polar-
ising or occasions for mediation and compromise.
So far, I have constructed a conceptual architecture to study democratic representation
and sanctions to representative democratic institutions in societies in which people disagree
on many things. First, I have provided a definition of democratic representation. Second, I
have demonstrated that democratic representation implies two kinds of sanction. Third, I
have identified the democratic module of innovations in democratic representative insti-
tutions. Fourth, I have argued that democratic representation occurs in a context in which
members of the demos disagree in a number of ways. In the next section, I bring together
the four steps of my argument.
Sanctioning Democratically
Represented and representatives are entitled to sanction institutions and practices, but
disagreements, which are an inherent feature of modern representative democracies, function
as firewalls that may safeguard democratic institutions against the prospect of change. In a
context of different interests and needs, members of a democratic political community who
feel they are misrepresented exercise their entitlement to sanction democratic institutions
and practices in a fully democratic way only when all firewalls are disabled. However, there
might be a gap between a demand for political transformation and the requirement that all
members of the political community should have an equal opportunity to influence collec-
tively binding decisions and actions. In plural and democratic societies, where members dis-
agree on many things, it is already difficult to find public decisions that all-affected subjects
can see as legitimate. Yet, drastic changes and incremental reforms make things even more
difficult. Changes and reforms involve a special kind of decision, one that encompasses
several disagreements at the same time. In this section, I will defend this claim by using
four examples: inclusive minority, nonconformist minority, homogeneous majority, and
plural majority.
Inclusive Minority
In the past two decades, participatory and deliberative democrats (e.g., Fishkin 2009;
Fung 2004) have studied a number of different forms of democratic innovation, such as parti-
cipatory budgeting (Syntomer et al. 2008), citizen panels, constitutional conventions (White
2017), deliberative polls (Fishkin 2009), and assemblies (Warren and Pearse 2009). And discus-
sions are still underway (e.g., Curato et al. 2017; Lupia and Norton 2017; Shapiro 2017). The lit-
erature displays so many examples (e.g., Fung 2004; Warren and Pearse 2009; Zurn 2007) that it
is impossible to account for the technicalities of each case in the present paper.
To be institutionalised in a way that significantly reshapes representative democratic
institutions, innovations require at least two things: agreement with a certain conception of
democracy (Fung 2005), and agreement between a subset of represented and representatives
who claim that existing institutional arrangements can be made more representative through
democratic experiments. Here the easy way would be to say that members of the demos dis-
agree on both fronts. For instance, Shapiro argues that deliberation may weaken representa-
tive democracies (2017). And disputes about the representativeness of deliberative fora are far
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from settled (Brown 2006). Let us, however, try to go a little deeper into the ways democratic
societies have implemented forms of democratic innovations. Usually, a subset of representa-
tive and represented motivates changes without appealing to a specific conception of the
good or to a distinctive representative relationship. They draw upon a conception of democ-
racy that all members of the demos could accept. Therefore, the claim is not eminently parti-
san. In this way, innovators can disable a number of different firewalls (D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D7,
and D8).
However, members of the demos may envisage different better-than-existing represen-
tative democratic institutions (D9), or they may disagree on these experiments as the best
means to deliver certain public goods (D6). So, for the move towards democratic representa-
tive institutions, which are deliberative in spirit, to be fully democratic, members of the inclus-
ive minority should find ways to convince other members of the demos (e.g., Fung 2005).
Notably, if we hold that the inclusive minority can disable D7, the two open firewalls do not
make democratic innovations undesirable. They are possible and, perhaps, for the betterment
of the whole demos. Nevertheless, D9 and D6 show that, even if the goal is laudable and con-
cerns with democratic representative institutions are widely shared, changes themselves may
occur in ways that partially fulfil the all-subjected principle.
Nonconformist Minority
When democratic institutions and practices exclude a minority group of representatives
and represented from institutionalised channels of decision-making, both poles of the relation-
ship of representation may be active, but their interests and needs remain at the periphery of
institutionalised law making for reasons that go beyond what the representatives and the rep-
resented aim to convey or what the representatives do and how the represented judge these
actions.
For instance, in the United States, there are several obstacles faced by new and small
parties. For example, in countries such as Canada, the UK, and the United States, proportional
representation is central to the agenda of several Green Parties. Recently, in the UK, leaders of
parties such as the Green Party and the UK Independence Party have complained that winner-
take-all systems cause systematic under-representation of certain interests and groups, despite
favourable electoral results.
In these examples, a subset of represented and representatives claim that institutional
arrangements deny them meaningful spaces to influence institutions-led actions, but this
claim remains eminently partisan. In other words, other members of the political community,
whose respective representative relationships revolve around different claims, do not necess-
arily share these concerns or the interest in reforming existing democratic institutions. For
example, in the UK, on 5 May 2011, a nationwide vote took place on whether to change the
system for electing the House of Commons, but the proposal to introduce a system of prefer-
ential voting was rejected by the electorate.
Moreover, the example of the Green Party suggests representatives and represented
envisage analogous ways to reform democratic institutions. But this is not always the case.
To the contrary, within party lines, some representatives and represented may contemplate
strategic moderation and favour coalition strategies. Others may opt for extending social
and political networks outside institutions. So the case of the nonconformist minority disables
only two firewalls that safeguard democratic institutions and practices: disagreement among
represented people who are represented by the same representatives (D2), and, perhaps,
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disagreement between such representatives and the holders of the interests they claim to rep-
resent (D4).
In an unfavourable political and institutional democratic landscape, the represented and
their representatives, both of whose intent is not to doubt the democratic character of their
society and the democratic character of representation, can exercise the entitlement to sanc-
tion democratic institutions and practices in ways that do not question other relationships of
representation. Boycotts and strikes are notable examples of sanctions against democratic
institutions and practices that do not directly affect the specific character of other relationships
of representation. They may induce considerations regarding democratic institutions and prac-
tices by contesting the authority of specific collectively binding decisions that affect the inter-
ests of otherwise-neglected representatives and represented. Notably, these actions do not
address the architecture of democratic institutions, but, in the long run, they may be strategic
for bringing into being an environment that supports innovation in democratic systems.
For nonconformist minorities, the entitlement to sanction democratic institutions and
practices can help strengthen democratic capacities and practices. These democratic discourses
may place the legitimacy of certain decisions at issue while insisting that democratic politics has
to be a politics of and about representation. In the same vein, for all disadvantaged categories for
which democratic representation has meant exclusion, prevarication, and reification, a non-insti-
tutional oppositional sphere may favour decentralising the political discussion.
In this way, nonconformist minorities may cast light upon exclusionary configurations of
democratic institutions and practices and, by deconstructing the construction of imaginary
interests and needs that dominant representatives claim to represent, inspire otherwise rep-
resented citizens to embrace their cause up to the point that the subsequent coalition can
disable all firewalls that block institutional innovation.
Homogeneous Majority
The story changes when a relatively homogeneous majority group of representative and
represented aims to change democratic institutions and practices. The case of the despotic
majority shows that democratic representative institutions are vulnerable to ways of reforming
democratic institutions and practices that undermine their democratic character from within.
Representatives may come up with a number of different reasons to change the same repre-
sentative system that has already put them in a position of power. Emergency, stability, and
governability of democracy are three prominent justificatory strategies to argue for reforms
of the representative system without (explicitly) challenging its democratic credentials.
For instance, on 16 April 2017, sponsored by the governing Justice and Development
Party and the Nationalist Movement Party, a constitutional referendum was held in Turkey
to reform the existing parliamentary system, curb the power of the parliament, and grant
sweeping powers to the president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. All this came together with the
closure of hundreds of non-elected representative groups, allegedly ‘working against the
state’.
The despotic majority does not disable any firewalls that safeguard democratic insti-
tutions and practices other than disagreement among represented who have the same repre-
sentatives (D2), and disagreement between represented and representatives (D4). However, a
despotic majority outnumbers the rest of the political community. And this opens space to
measures that may sanction the democratic institutions and practices by using nondemocratic
or quasi-democratic instruments.
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These measures may be different in character and in their targets. Erdogan banned
NGOs and civil-society organisations. In India, the license of several NGOs was revoked for ‘anti-
national activities’. Moreover, democratic institutions and practices may be sanctioned through
referenda, public consultation, and plebiscites that fundamentally reform the architecture of
the representative system and establish a single-party system. Elections and other formal trap-
pings of representative democracy persist but lose meaning, since authority is centralised and
representatives are not accountable for the decisions of strongmen.
A despotic majority may weaken democratic practices and capacities. It ascribes aims,
interests, and needs to the represented, but these aims, interests, and needs are not subject
to dialogue and instead serve the legitimising discourse of the executive power and its
fellows in weak representative institutions.
An analogous discourse is valid when we consider the case of a benevolent majority. A
benevolent majority is homogeneous and aims to change democratic institutions and prac-
tices in order to include otherwise-neglected interests. By doing so, the benevolent majority
ascribes a list of interests and needs to other members of the political community. It acts as
if democratic firewalls have been disabled, when, in fact, they have not.
Plural Majority
Despotic majority is not the only kind of majority that can aim to change democratic
institutions and practices. A majority composed of a series of elected and non-elected clai-
mants with different interests and needs may aim for reforms of democratic institutions and
practices when these institutions are exclusionary or have limited decision-making power.
A variegated majority of European stakeholders has drawn attention to the democratic
deficit of EU institutions. Over the past 30 years, EU treaties have regularly increased the
powers of the European Parliament. Nevertheless, media, politicians, social movements,
civil-society groups, scholars, and citizens still claim that a democratic deficit affects the EU.
National parliaments have cast doubts on the European Parliament’s democratic credentials.
Notably though, several national politicians and civil-society groups are ignorant about the
EU and its rules. Moreover, representatives and members of civil-society groups have com-
plained that EU procedures and a technical policy language are informal obstacles that
leave some interests at the margins of institutionalised democratic institutions and practices.
Supporters of reforms may disagree on the design of the new representative institutions
(D9). Actually, there have been hundreds of proposals to reform representative institutions in
the EU. Further, members of the coalition of reformers may continue defending their interests
and needs, and the reasons for reforming EU institutions may be different from one claimant to
another (D1).
Therefore, even in this case, despite a common interest in reforming democratic insti-
tutions and practices, in plural societies, the tenacity of other firewalls may affect the
process of changing democratic representative institutions in fully democratic ways. In a
context in which members of the demos disagree on many things, and changes involve
special kinds of decision that encompass several fronts of disagreement at the same time,
the cases of the inclusive minority, nonconformist minority, despotic and benevolent
majorities, and plural majority show that it is very difficult for the process of sanctioning demo-
cratic representative to unfold in a way that is fully compliant with the all-subjected principle. If
representatives and those they represent feel they are misrepresented, they are entitled to
sanction democratic institutions and practices. The fully democratic exercise of this
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entitlement is another story. Unless citizens across the spectrum of all representative relation-
ships feel they are misrepresented (and agree on the prospect of change), sanctions may cause
violations of the democratic principle that all members of the demos are not mere objects of
legislation or external coercion.
Conclusion
My argument has provided a, perhaps pessimistic, account of democratic change in
democratic representative institutions. The perspective may seem pessimistic because it
says it is very difficult to change democratic representative institutions while remaining com-
pliant with the all-subjected principle in all areas of disagreement. Representatives and rep-
resented can have noble democratic intentions and produce good democratic innovations.
But, even from a conceptual standpoint, the process leading to these changes may entail
some violations of the fundamental all-subjected principle.
In this context, I have argued that citizens have an entitlement to sanction representa-
tives, but representatives have tools to anticipate this sanction and reconstruct their views in
order to anticipate the views of the people they are supposed to represent. I also have argued
that represented and representatives have an entitlement to sanction democratic institutions
and practices, but a number of different disagreements may complicate the process of reform-
ing institutions and practices in fully democratic ways. Overall, this paper clarifies the norma-
tive justification of sanctions in the context of plural representative democracies. At the same
time, it opens a research line on disagreement within and about representative democracies.
Disagreements are many and with different consequences. Here I have focused my attention
on one of those implications: how disagreements may affect the democratic character of pro-
cesses leading to change democratic representative institutions.
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NOTES
1. For this reason, all members of the demos are de facto subjected to all laws, changes and
legislation within the jurisdiction of the state.
2. This does not mean to say that represented are misrepresented. Like Severs (2010), I agree
that there is a significant conceptual difference between being misrepresented and feeling mis-
represented. However, in this case, this conceptual difference is particularly thin. Represented
citizens establish new representative relationships. And there might be a number of different
reasons for these new representative relationships, and many of these reasons might not be
fully rational. For instance, manipulatory politics may convince represented citizens that their
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representatives are misrepresenting them, represented citizens may have new interests and
needs because of a particularly short-sighted view, and moral sentiments such as friendship,
anger, and love may affect political preferences of represented citizens.
3. Dovi puts this in the context of an ethics of democratic representation. In her view, an ethics
of democratic representation should help democratic citizens to be in a better position to
‘differentiate between the faults of representative institutions (e.g. improper norms or pro-
cedures for determining policies) and bad performance of individual representatives’ (Dovi
2007: 49).
4. For a programme of reform that allows for resistance and a series of institutional means to
overcome structures of domination, see Hamilton (2014).
5. When all citizens accept the justification for sanctioning democratic practices and institutions,
it seems plausible to think that they not only feel that they are misrepresented, but they are
misrepresented, regardless of what democratic institutions do.
6. I have derived the list of disagreement deductively from theoretical expectations about a
standard situation of institutional change in plural liberal democracies. My list aims at offering
the essential fronts of disagreements. It is by no means exhaustive. There might be many
other sources of disagreement, but they would not change the nature of my argument. Actu-
ally, the more disagreements we have, the more difficult it becomes to change democratic
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